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Abstract—With increasing renewable penetration in
power systems, a prominent challenge in the efficient and
reliable power system operation is handling the uncertain-
ties inherent in the renewable generation. In this paper,
we propose a simple two-settlement market mechanism
in which renewable power producers (RPPs) participate
so that a) the independent system operator (ISO) does
not need to consider the uncertainties of the renewables
in its economic dispatch, and yet b) the market equi-
librium is shown to approach social efficiency as if the
ISO solves a stochastic optimization problem taking into
account all the uncertainties. In showing this result, a
key innovation is a new approach of efficiently computing
the Nash equilibrium (NE) among the strategic RPPs in
congestion-constrained power networks. In particular, the
proposed approach decouples finding an NE into searching
over congestion patterns and computing an NE candidate
assuming a congestion pattern. As such, the computational
complexity of finding an NE grows only polynomially with
the number of RPPs in the market. We demonstrate our
results in the IEEE 14-bus system and show that the NE
approaches social efficiency as the number of RPPs grows.
I. INTRODUCTION
Renewable energy plays a central role in achieving a
sustainable energy future. However, renewable genera-
tion such as wind and solar power are inherently non-
dispatchable, and highly uncertain and variable. As a
result, integrating renewable energy into power systems
raises significant challenges on reliability and efficiency
for power system operations [1]. In particular, in oper-
ating an electricity market with renewable generation,
how to take into account their uncertainties in order to
achieve optimal system operation is a major issue and
an active area of research.
A. Background and related work
The primary goal of an ISO who runs an electricity
market is to maximize the social welfare (or, equiva-
lently, minimizing the social cost) while assuring secure
power system operation. Ideally, achieving such goals
The authors are listed alphabetically.
in the presence of the uncertain renewables can be for-
mulated as a (potentially multi-stage and multi-period)
stochastic optimization problem [2], [3], [4].
Recent progress has substantially improved the scal-
ability of multistage stochastic programs (see e.g. [5],
[6]). However, significant challenges still remain for
handling mixed integer decisions and contingency con-
straints. Another more subtle but fundamental challenge
is that, for a stochastic program to be employed in an
electricty market, a) the probability distributions of all
underlying stochastic processes must be known to and
agreed upon by all market participants, including the
ISO, and b) a particular sample average approximation
of the stochastic processes and the associated set of sce-
narios also must be accepted to all market participants.
It is a very challenging task to accurately a) estimate and
b) form a consensus of these distributions when critical
information of market participants remain private in a
market setting.
In addition to challenges in modeling and computation
of the optimal system operation problem, another major
concern of the ISOs’ is the strategic behaviors of market
participants. Indeed, an ISO typically depends on market
participants to provide information on their resources
such as generation cost/willingness to generate, capacity,
and other constraints. Assuming that the participants
provide their true information, an ISO can then solve for
the optimal system operation that minimizes the social
cost. However, market participants do not necessarily
behave truthfully, but rather may behave strategically by
providing information that benefit themselves. Indeed,
such strategic behavior in electricity market has been a
subject of intense study, in particular, via the analysis of
Nash equilibria (NE) in the market clearing game played
between the market participants and the ISO.
Several approaches have been proposed to compute
NE in electricity markets, albeit not yet considering
uncertain generation from RPPs. One is to solve equilib-
rium problems with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) [2],
[7]. This approach is however not without limitations, as
its high computational complexity can become a major
bottleneck as the number of strategic players increases.
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2Another approach is to solve for supply function equi-
librium (SFE) [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]. It is however
technically challenging for this approach to generalize to
congested power networks, although recent progress has
been made in this direction [13]. The electricity market
model has also been simplified to Cournot competition.
Computation and analysis of NE in such settings have
been studied in [14], [15], [16].
Considering RPPs with uncertain generation as partic-
ipants in a two-settlement market, NE among RPPs has
been studied only for limited settings. Most of the work
assume price-taking RPPs and do not consider network
congestion constraints. The key issue here boils down to
payoff allocation among an aggregation of RPPs [17],
[18], [19], [20]. A recent work [21] puts forward a simple
payoff allocation mechanism that achieves a set of desir-
able properties, including achieving the maximum social
welfare at the unique NE among the RPPs. Generalizing
the price-taking assumption to price-making, albeit still
not considering network constraints, another recent work
proposes a market mechanism for RPPs with which the
NE enjoys an analytical form and is proved to converge
to social efficiency as the number of RPPs grows [22].
B. Contributions of this work
This paper a) proposes a two-settlement market mech-
anism for RPPs that takes full account of the power net-
work congestion constraints, b) develops a new method
for efficiently computing the NE of an electricity market,
in this work specifically applied to our proposed mech-
anism, and c) demonstrates that the proposed market
mechanism for RPPs leads to NE that approach social
efficiency as the number RPPs grows.
The proposed market mechanism is in fact quite
intuitive, and not far from the current practice of the
ISOs, but simpler. Specifically, a) in the day-ahead (DA)
market, each RPP only submits a single number of its
production level, a “commitment”, to the ISO; b) the ISO
treats the RPPs’ commitments as firm, performs the DA
optimal dispatch without considering any uncertainty,
and pays the RPPs using the DA locational marginal
prices (LMPs); c) in the real-time (RT) market, the RPPs
generation are realized; and d) the ISO performs the RT
optimal dispatch to resolve all the power imbalances,
and pays and/or charges the RPPs using the RT LMPs
and according to their realized generation’s deviations
from the DA commitments. As such, in the proposed
market mechanism, the ISO is freed from the burden of
modeling renewable uncertainties, and is only concerned
with solving a deterministic market clearing problem.
To be able to evaluate the outcome of the proposed
mechanism under strategic behaviors of the RPPs, we
develop a new method for computing the NE of the
two-settlement market. The key idea lies in the fact
that, if a congestion pattern is given, computing the
NE is not much more complicated than the uncongested
case. Accordingly, we decouple the search for NE into
a) search over congestion patterns, and b) computing
the NE candidates given congestion patterns. As such,
we can show that the computational complexity of
the proposed method for computing NE scales only
cubically with the number of RPPs. Furthermore, re-
cent results from [23], [24], [25], [26] as well as the
conventional wisdom in practice both suggest that the
number of potential congestion patterns in a real-world
power system is relatively small. Therefore, the proposed
method can be quite efficient in real-world systems. In
computation experiments, we demonstrate the proposed
mechanism and the computed NE in a congested IEEE
14-bus system. We show that the NE approaches social
efficiency as the number of RPPs grows. The intuition
is that the competition among the RPPs pushes the NE
toward social efficiency, even though the ISO does not
consider any uncertainty in its DA and RT dispatches in
the proposed mechanism.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROPOSED MECHANISM
We consider a two-settlement market consisting of
a Day-Ahead (DA) market (forward) and a Real-Time
(RT) market (spot) run by an ISO. The participants of
this two-settlement market include:
• Renewable Power Producers (RPPs).
• DA conventional generators that can be dispatched
in the DA market.
• RT conventional generators that can be dispatched
in the RT market.
• Loads.
Note that the set of DA and RT conventional generators
can have an arbitrary overlap. In other words, the same
generator, if capable, can choose to participate in both
the DA and RT markets. In this study, our focus is on the
strategic behaviors of RPPs. As such, we assume that a)
the conventional generators are truthful in submitting to
the ISO their costs, capacities, etc., and b) the loads are
inelastic and known.
A. Proposed mechanism with price-making RPPs
Motivated by the near-zero variable cost of renewable
generation, we propose a two-settlement market where
both conventional generators and RPPs participate in as
follows:
1) In the DA market:
a) Each DA conventional generator submits its
bidding curve to the ISO.
b) Each RPP k submits a firm commitment ck
for its power delivery at RT.
3c) Upon receiving these information, the ISO
considers the RPPs’ DA commitments as
firm, i.e., negative loads, and performs an
optimal dispatch of the DA conventional gen-
erators to meet all the loads.
d) The ISO pays each RPP using the DA LMPs
computed from the optimal DA dispatch, in
the amount of λDΩkck.
2) In the RT market,
a) Each RT conventional generator submits its
bidding curve to the ISO.
b) Each RPP’s actual generation xk is realized.
c) The ISO resolves all the deviations between
the RPPs’ DA commitments and their real-
ized generation by optimally dispatching the
RT conventional generators.
d) The ISO pays each RPP using the RT LMPs
computed from the optimal RT dispatch,
in the (possibly negative) amount of λRΩk ·
(xk − ck).
Here, we focus on the problem of economic dispatch,
and leave out the problem of unit commitment for future
work. As commonly employed in electricity market
computation, we assume the DC approximation of power
flows [27]. We then make a modeling assumption that
the conventional generators’ generation cost functions
are quadratic in its power production. Furthermore, we
do not consider generator capacity constraints in this
paper, and consider them to be approximated by properly
chosen quadratic functions. We note that, these modeling
assumptions are not restrictive as the proposed method
of finding NE can be straightforwardly generalized to
cases where cost functions are higher order polynomials
and generator capacities are considered.
Before continuing, we summarize the notations of the
relevant variables in Table I.
B. DA and RT Market Clearing
We now describe the details of the ISO’s optimal
dispatch problems that clear the DA and RT markets.
a) DA market: In the DA market, the ISO takes the
RPPs’ commitments {ck} as firm, and then schedules
the DA conventional generators to meet the net loads by
solving the following DA economic dispatch problem:
min
qD
∑
i∈SDG
CDi
(
qDi
)
=
∑
i∈SDG
(
1
2
αDi · (qDi )2 + βDi qDi
)
(1a)
s.t.
∑
i∈SDG
qDi =
∑
u∈N
LDu −
∑
k∈SR
ck, (1b)
∣∣ ∑
u∈N
PTDF (m,n)u,o · q˜Du −
∑
v∈N
PTDF (m,n)v,o · q˜Dv
∣∣
TABLE. I. NOMENCLATURE
CDi (·) , CRj (·) Cost functions of the DA conventional generator
i and RT conventional generator j.
αDi , β
D
i Quadratic and linear cost coefficients of DA gen-
erator i.
αRj , β
R
j Quadratic and linear cost coefficients of RT gen-
erator j.
qDi , q
R
j Power dispatches of the DA conventional genera-
tor i and RT conventional generator j.
qD, qR Vectors of power dispatches of the DA and RT
conventional generators.
q˜Du , q˜
R
u Net nodal power injections at bus u at the DA and
RT markets.
q˜D, q˜R Vectors of the net nodal power injections at the
DA and RT markets.
LDu Nodal load at bus u at the DA market.
LD Vector of nodal loads at the DA market.
ck Firm power commitment submitted by RPP k.
c Vector of firm power commitment submitted by
RPPs.
{c˜k} Set of DA commitments that is a solution to the
best response condition for the RPPs.
xk Realization of the power output of RPP k.
x Vector of realization of power outputs of RPPs.
λDu , λ
R
u LMPs at DA and RT markets for bus u.
λD,λR Vectors of LMPs at DA and RT markets.
Pk, pik The realized and expected payment of RPP k.
pi The vector of expected payment of RPPs.
T (m,n) Line capacity of line between bus m and n.
T c,D,T c,R Vectors of capacities of the congested lines in the
DA and RT market.
Ωk Index of the bus where RPP k is located.
o Index of the Slack bus.
N , N Set of buses, and number of buses.
I, J Number of DA and RT conventional generators.
K Number of RPPs.
nc,DT , n
c,R
T Number of congested lines in the DA and RT
market.
Sc,DT , S
c,R
T Sets of congested lines in the DA and RT markets.
ST Set of lines.
SDG , S
R
G Sets of DA and RT conventional generators.
SR Set of RPPs.
SDG,u, S
R
G,u, SR,u Sets of DA and RT conventional generators and
RPPs located on bus u.
PTDF
(m,n)
u,v Change in the flow of line (m,n) for the injection
of 1 unit of power at bus u and withdrawal of it
from bus v.
diag(·) If the input is a matrix, the return is its diagonal
as a vector; if the input is a vector, the return
is a diagonal matrix with the given vector as the
diagonal.
≤ T (m,n), ∀(m,n) ∈ ST , (1c)
where PTDF refers to power transmission distribution
factor, and q˜Du =
∑
i∈SDG,u q
D
i +
∑
k∈SR,u ck−LDu is the
nodal net power injection at bus u. Note that at some
4buses there may be no DA conventional generator and/or
no RPP. We write the vector q˜D as:
q˜D = EDGq
D + ERc−LD, (2)
where the element on row r and column t of EDG is 1
if the DA conventional generator t is located on bus r,
and is 0 otherwise. Similarly, the element on row r and
column t of ER is 1 if the RPPt is located on bus r, and
is 0 otherwise. From solving the DA economic dispatch
on (1a)-(1c), we get the DA-LMPs
(
λD
)
. The payment
to RPP k (located at bus Ωk) at the DA market is λDΩkck.
b) RT market: In the RT market, the RPPs ob-
serve their actual power generation {xi}. The deviations
between the RPPs’ DA commitments and their actual
power generation is settled by optimally dispatching the
RT conventional generators:
min
qR
∑
j∈SRG
CRj
(
qˆRj
)
=
∑
j∈SRG
(
1
2
αRj · (qˆRj )2 + βRj qˆRj
)
(3a)
s.t.
∑
j∈SRG
qRj =
∑
k∈SR
(ck − xk)
= 1TLR + 1TLD − 1TqD − 1Tx, (3b)∣∣∑
u∈N
PTDF (m,n)u,o · q˜Ru −
∑
v∈N
PTDF (m,n)v,o · q˜Rv
∣∣
≤ T (m,n), ∀(m,n) ∈ ST , (3c)
where q˜Ru =
∑
j∈SRG,u q
R
j +
∑
i∈SDG,u q
D
i +
∑
k∈SR,u xk−
LDu − LRu is the net nodal power injection at bus u in
the RT market. qˆRj = q
R
j + q
D
i if the RT generator
j participated in the DA market as DA generator i,
otherwise, qˆRj = q
R
j . Note that on some buses there may
be no RT conventional generator and/or no RPP. We
write the vector q˜R as:
q˜R = ERGq
R + EDGq
D + ERx−LD −LR, (4)
where the element on row r and column t of ERG is 1
if the RT conventional generator t is located on bus r,
and is 0 otherwise.
Remark 1: LR is the vector of fictitious nodal loads at
the RT market, and all the components of this vector are
zero. The reason for keeping LR in the formulations is
that it helps to derive the nodal LMPs in the RT market
(cf. (36) and (37) in Appendix B.)
Remark 2: As we mentioned in Section II-A, there
may be cases where some of the conventional generators
participate in both the DA and RT markets. If generator
i in the DA market is the same as the generator j in
the RT market, then qDi (derived from solving (1a)-(1c))
is its dispatch in the DA market, and qRj (derived from
solving (3a)-(3c)) is its dispatch in the RT market. Hence
the total dispatch of this generator in the two-settlement
market is qDi + q
R
j .
From solving RT economic dispatch (3a)-(3c), we get
the RT-LMPs
(
λR
)
. The payment to RPPk, located at
bus Ωk, at the RT market is λRΩk · (xk − ck).
The total realized payment to RPPk is
Pk = λDΩkck + λRΩk · (xk − ck) . (5)
The expected total payment to RPPk is thus
pik = E [Pk] = λDΩkck + E
[
λRΩk · (xk − ck)
]
. (6)
C. Outcome of the mechanism: commitment game and
its Nash equilibria
Now we analyze the outcome of the proposed mech-
anism (cf. Section II-A). This amounts to analyzing
the Nash equilibria of the two-settlement market. In
the proposed mechanism, each RPP has one decision
variable, its DA commitment. Intuitively, RPPk will
choose a ck that maximizes its expected payoff (6). The
strategic behaviors of the RPPs can be modeled as a
non-cooperative game, termed the commitment game:
• Players: The set of RPPs participating in the DA-
RT market: SR = {1, · · · ,K} .
• Strategies: The set of firm generation commitments
made by the RPPs.
• Payoffs: Each RPP k’s payoff is its expected pay-
ment pik defined in (6).
The solution concept that best predicts the outcome
in such a non-cooperative game is the Nash equilibria
(NE): At a pure NE, no player has an incentive to
unilaterally change its strategy, i.e., every RPP is best
responding (i.e. playing an optimal commitment level)
given all other RPPs’ commitments. Specifically, for the
commitment game,
Pure NE: A DA commitment profile (c?1, · · · , c?K) is a
pure NE if and only if, for every RPPk ∈ SR, we have
pik
(
c?k, c
?
−k
) ≥ pik (ck, c?−k) , ∀ck ∈ Γk, (7)
where c?−k is the vector of commitments of the other
RPPs except RPPk at the NE, and Γk is the strategy
space of RPPk. We allow each RPP to submit any real
number as its DA commitment, i.e. Γk = R.
In order to analyze the commitment game, it would
be convenient to have closed form expressions of the
DA and RT LMPs. We show in the next section that,
assuming the knowledge of which lines are congested, a
closed form expression of the corresponding LMPs can
be derived.
III. CLOSED FORM EXPRESSIONS OF LMPS
In this section, we derive the closed form expressions
of the LMPs in the DA and RT markets.
5A. DA Market LMPs
The DA economic dispatch problem in (1a)-(1c) is
a convex quadratic optimization problem. The KKT
conditions are necessary and sufficient conditions for the
optimality of (1a)-(1c). Here, our objective is to leverage
the KKT conditions to obtain closed-form expressions
of the LMPs. The difficulty lies in that we do not
know a-priori which inequalities (corresponding to the
transmission line flow constraints) in (1c) are binding
at the optimal solution. The key idea to overcome this
difficulty is the following: If we assume the knowledge
of which lines are congested, which we term assumed
DA congestion pattern, the rest of the KKT conditions
can then be solved in closed form. We summarize this
result as follows.
Theorem 1: For an assumed DA congestion pattern in
the DA market, the optimal solution of the DA economic
dispatch in (1a)-(1c) is a linear function of the DA
commitments of the RPPs as
qD = GD1 c+G
D
2 . (8)
Similarly, the DA-LMPs at the DA market is a linear
function of the DA commitments of the RPPs as
λD = HD1 c+H
D
2 . (9)
The proof of Theorem 1 and the closed forms of matrices
GD1 , G
D
2 , H
D
1 , and H
D
2 can be found in Appendix A.
B. RT market LMPs
The approach for finding closed form expressions of
RT market LMPs is similar to that for the DA LMPs.
Assuming the knowledge of the congestion pattern at the
RT market, the rest of the KKT conditions for the RT
dispatch problem (3a)-(3c) can be solved in closed form.
Theorem 2: For an assumed RT congestion pattern in
the RT market, a given set of power dispatches of DA
conventional generators in the DA market, the optimal
solution of the RT economic dispatch in (3a)-(3c) is a
linear function of the RPPs’ DA commitments and RT
realizations as
qR = GR1 c+G
R
2 x+G
R
3 . (10)
Similarly, the RT-LMPs is a linear function of the RPPs’
DA commitments and RT realizations as
λR = HR1 c+H
R
2 x+H
R
3 . (11)
The proof of Theorem 2 and the closed forms of matrices
GR1 , G
R
2 , G
R
3 , H
R
1 , H
R
2 , and H
R
3 can be found in
Appendix B.
IV. ALGORITHM FOR FINDING NASH EQUILIBRIA
The key idea that helps finding an NE among the RPPs
(cf. (7)) is that, if the DA and RT congestion patterns
at an NE are known, finding the NE {c?k} given the
congestion patterns is easy. Then, one can search and
test if any DA and RT congestion patterns are indeed
the ones that lead to an NE.
A. Best responses assuming DA and RT congestion
patterns
Assuming any pair of DA and RT congestion patterns,
we have from the last section the corresponding expres-
sions of the LMPs λD and λR (9) and (11). Substituting
these LMP expressions in (6), the vector of payoffs of
the RPPs pi , [pi1, · · · , piK ]> becomes
pi = diag
(
(ER)
>λD
)
c+ E
[
diag
(
(ER)
>λR
)
(x− c)] .
(12)
From the linearity of the LMP expressions in (9) and
(11), the payoffs of the RPPs in (12) are concave
quadratic functions. As such, the NE condition in (7)
reduces to the following set of linear equations
dpik
dck
∣∣∣
(c1,··· ,cK)=(c?1 ,··· ,c?K)
= 0, ∀k ∈ SR. (13)
The details of this set of linear best response equations
are provided below:[
dpik
dck
]
,
[
dpi1
dc1
, · · · , dpiK
dcK
]>
=
(
diag
(
diag
(
(ER)
> (HD1 −HR1 )))
+ (ER)
> (HD1 −HR1 ) )c
+ (ER)
> (HD2 −HR2 µ−HR3 )
+ diag
(
diag
(
(ER)
>HR1
))
µ = 0. (14)
The solution to this set of linear equations (13)-(14),
denoted by {c˜k}, provides an NE candidate of the com-
mitment game. Whether this renders a true NE depends
on if the assumed DA and RT congestion patterns are
indeed the ones at a true NE. Notably, computing such
an NE candidate is as easy as solving a set of linear
equations.
B. Algorithm to Find Pure NE
1) Consistency of DA congestion pattern: For an
assumed DA congestion pattern to be one at a true NE,
it is necessary that the corresponding NE candidate {c˜k}
satisfies the following condition: Given {c˜k} as the DA
firm commitments from the RPPs, as the ISO solves
the optimal DA dispatch problem (cf. (1a)-(1c)), the
resulting actual DA congestion pattern is the same as
the assumed one. Otherwise, the assumed DA congestion
pattern is an incorrect guess of that at a true NE.
62) Probability of consistency of RT congestion pat-
tern: Similarly, we can check the consistency between
the assumed and actual RT congestion patterns. This is
however more subtle than checking the consistency for
DA congestion patterns. Note that, the RPPs’ decisions,
firm commitments {ck}, are made at DA, when their
actual generations at RT are still uncertain. As such, at
DA, the future actual RT congestion pattern when the
ISO clears the RT market is uncertain. To be precise,
given a set of RPPs’ DA commitments {ck} and the
ISO’s DA dispatch decisions, the optimal RT dispatch
depends on the uncertain generation {xk}, and there is a
probability distribution over what RT congestion pattern
would result from the optimal RT dispatch [23].
In this work, we proceed with an approximation of
the above situation. Instead of having each RPP to
consider a probability distribution over RT congestion
patterns, we assume that each RPP just considers one RT
congestion pattern. We will then evaluate the probability
of this one congestion pattern appearing at RT: When
this probability is sufficiently high, we argue that this
approximation is a close one.
Now, with the above approximation, instead of check-
ing the consistency between the assumed and actual
congestion patterns as in DA, we check the probability of
such consistency. Specifically, given an assumed RT con-
gestion pattern, the corresponding NE candidate {c˜k},
and the resulting DA optimal dispatch, a) depending on
the realized generation {xk}, the ISO would solve an
optimal RT dispatch problem (3a)-(3c), resulting in an
RT congestion pattern, and b) based on the uncertainty
in {xk}, the probability of this resulting RT congestion
pattern being the same as the assumed one is computed
as the probability of consistency.
Accordingly, a) we first require the “absolute” con-
sistency of DA congestion pattern as in Section IV-B1,
(otherwise the NE candidate is not a true NE for sure),
and then b) the probability of consistency of RT con-
gestion pattern can be interpreted as the probability that
this NE candidate is a true NE.
3) The proposed algorithm of finding NE: Based
on the above development, we provide the algorithm
for finding the pure NE of the commitment game in
Algorithm 1. In this algorithm, various heuristics can
be employed in searching over congestion patterns. One
approach is to collect a set of possible DA and RT
congestion patterns and simply cycle through all of them.
As straightforward as this may sound, it can actually be
quite effective in practice, especially because the set of
possible congestion patterns are often reasonably limited
in power networks [23], [24], [25], [26].
V. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we demonstrate the main results of
the paper with simulations on the IEEE 14-bus system.
Algorithm 1 Searching For Pure NE
Input: Set of candidate pairs of DA and RT congestion
patterns
Output: Set of pure NE with probabilities of being valid
Initialization : Set of pure NE = empty set
1: for each candidate pair of DA and RT congestion
patterns: do
2: Determine the linear functions for the DA and RT
LMPs for these assumed DA and RT congestion
patterns as in (9) and (11).
3: Compute the DA commitments for this NE can-
didate, {c˜k}, as in (13).
4: Applying the DA commitments, solve the DA
economic dispatch problem (1a)-(1c), and find the
actual DA congestion pattern.
5: if the actual DA congestion pattern is the same
as the assumed DA congestion pattern then
6: a) Based on the probability distribution over
the RPPs’ generation {xk}, compute the prob-
ability that the actual congestion pattern from
solving the RT optimal dispatch problem is the
same as the assumed RT congestion pattern.
7: b) Add the DA commitments {c˜k} to the set of
pure NE, and record the above probability of it
being valid.
8: end if
9: end for
10: return Set of pure NE with probabilities of being
valid.
A Python module is written for simulating the two-
settlement market and the proposed algorithm for finding
NE. The module and simulation codes are available at
[28]. The nodal demands, nominal parameters of RPPs
(which will be further varied), and parameters of conven-
tional generators are listed in Tables II, III, and IV. We
note that, the standard deviation of RPPs’ generation in
Table III can be interpreted as the standard deviation of
the DA forecast error of the renewable generation. In this
nominal case, the forecast error has a standard deviation
of 15% of the point forecast of generation. This is in fact
quite a conservative assumption on forecast accuracy, as
it is less accurate than a typical DA forecast (e.g., with
a 11.9% std/mean as reported in [29]).
In what follows, we will first present results on finding
the NE among two RPPs located at two different buses.
We will then show that the NE converges to social
efficiency as the number of RPPs grows.
A. Finding pure NE
In our simulations, it suffices to search for NE over
congestion patterns assuming a) the DA and RT conges-
tion patterns are the same, and b) no more than 2 lines
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Fig. 1. (a) Probability of consistency of RT congestion pattern vs. the uncertainty of RPPs, (b) Expected system cost: competing RPPs
vs. social optimum as the number of RPPs grows, (c) Difference between DA and expected RT LMPs as the number of RPPs grows.
TABLE. II. DATA OF NODAL DEMANDS
bus 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
load 0 43.4 64.8 41.6 15.2 22.4 20
bus 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
load 50 59 18 27 32.2 27.6 29.8
TABLE. III. DATA OF RPPS
bus Mean (MWh) Standard Deviation (MWh)
4 70 10.5
11 50 7.5
are simultaneously congested. The following pure NE is
found: (c?1, c
?
2) = (77.270, 46.095). The corresponding
DA congestion pattern is that a single line #19 is
congested.
Next, we check the probability of consistency of
the RT congestion pattern (cf. Section IV-B2) which is
assumed to be the same as the DA one. We employ an
Monte Carlo approach for computing this probability.
We generate 500 scenarios for the renewable generation
(cf. Table III) assuming normal distribution. For each
scenario, we clear the RT market by optimally dispatch-
ing the RT conventional generators (cf. (3a) - (3c)) and
find the actual RT congestion pattern. The probability of
consistency of RT congestion pattern is then computed
as the ratio between a) the number of scenarios where
the assumed and actual RT congestion patterns agree,
and b) the total number of scenarios (in our case 500).
The resulting probability is 76% for the nominal case in
Table III, a reasonably high consistency.
Intuitively, this probability of consistency at RT de-
pends on the level of uncertainty of the renewables. As
such, we evaluate this probability with varying level of
uncertainty: For std/mean of RPPs’ generation ranging
from 0 to 25%, we repeat the scenario based Monte Carlo
computation of the probability as above, and plot the
resulting probabilities of consistency at RT in Figure 1a.
As expected, when there is no uncertainty, the assumed
TABLE. IV. DATA OF DA AND RT GENERATORS
DA Conventional Generators RT Conventional Generators
bus
αD
(
$
(MWh)2
)
βD
(
$
MWh
)
bus
αR
(
$
(MWh)2
)
βR
(
$
MWh
)
7 0.06 3.51 4 0.24 9.35
8 0.09 3.89 12 0.26 11.51
11 0.08 2.15
RT congestion pattern appears with 100% probability.
Even with a 25% std/mean of the RPPs’ generation
(corresponding to very poor forecast), the probability of
consistency at RT is still above 65%.
B. Convergence of NE to social efficiency
We now investigate the important question of how
close the NE is from social efficiency. Inspired by the
intuition from [22], we expect that the gap between the
NE and the social optimum decreases as the number
of RPPs grows. Here, we break up the RPP at each
of the two buses into an increassing number of equal-
sized market participants. For each case, we recompute
the NE. The expected system costs for all these cases
are plotted in Fig. 1b, and compared with the social
optimum obtained by solving a two-stage stochastic
optimization problem. Indeed, the expected system cost
at the NE decreases as the total number of RPPs grows,
and converges to that at the social optimum, (although
we only plotted for up to a total of 30 RPPs, and the
convergence is numerically confirmed as the number of
RPPs further increases). Details for computing the social
optimum can be found in Appendix C, where a penalty
factor of ψ = 5000 is employed (cf. (41a) - (41f)). We
further plot the trends of the differences between the DA
and RT LMPs as the number of RPPs grows in Figure 1c.
Notably, a) due to the congestion at the NE, the LMPs at
all the buses are different; nonetheless, b) their DA-RT
8differences all decrease as the NE converges to social
efficiency.
As a result, we observe that the following advantage
of the proposed mechanism for RPPs: Even with the
ISO fully relying on RPPs’ DA commitments and only
solving deterministic economic dispatch, the NE of
the proposed market mechanism still converges to the
social optimum as if a full-blown two-stage stochastic
optimization is solved. The intuition is that, enabled
by the proposed mechanism, the competition among
the RPPs successfully pushes the NE toward social
efficiency, again without the ISO considering any of their
uncertainty whatsoever.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a simple market mechanism for
integrating renewable power producers (RPPs) in power
systems. In it, a) the RPPs submit firm power delivery
commitments in the DA market, b) the ISO solves a
deterministic DA economic dispatch problem, and the
RPPs are paid according to the resulting DA LMPs and
their DA commitments, c) in the RT market, the RPPs’
generation are realized, d) the ISO solves a determin-
istic RT economic dispatch problem, and the RPPs are
paid/charged according to the resulting RT LMPs and
their realizations’ deviations from the DA commitments.
We developed a novel method for efficiently finding pure
Nash equilibria (NE) of the market among the RPPs. In
particular, we search over congestion patterns, compute
NE candidates given assumed congestion patterns, and
verify if they are true NE or not. Simulation results
show that, the NE of the proposed market mechanism
converges to social efficiency as the number of the RPPs
grows. Notably, this is achieved without having the ISO
to consider any uncertainty whatsoever in its dispatch
decisions.
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9APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let Sc,DT be the set of the lines that are congested
in the DA market, for which each line (m,n) in it is
congested in the direction of bus m to bus n. First,
let’s rewrite (1c) for those lines where the inequality is
binding:
ADq˜D = T c,D, (15)
where AD and T c,D are derived from writing (1c)
only for binding inequalities. There is one more set of
matrices that we need to define:
ADG , ADEDG
ADR , ADER, (16)
ΥD ,
α
D
1 0
. . .
0 αDI
 (17)
and
ZD ,

ΥD
(
ADG
)>
1I×1
ADG 0nc,DT ×nc,DT 0nc,DT ×1
11×I 01×nc,DT 0
 (18)
Writing the KKT optimality conditions for (1a)-(1c), we
have:
ZD ·

qD
γD
τD
=

−βD
ADLD + T c,D −ADRc
1>LD − 1>c
 (19)
Where βD =
[
βD1 , · · · , βDI
]>
, and γD =[
γD1 , · · · , γDnc,DT
]>
, where γDt is the dual variable
of the congested line t in the DA economic dispatch
problem (cf. (1c)). τD is the dual variable of the power
balance equation in the DA economic dispatch (cf.
(1b)). The first I equations in (19) is for the stationarity
conditions. The following nc,DT equations corresponds
to the complementary slackness conditions for those
inequalities that are bindings in (1c) by setting the
line flow of those lines equal to their capacities. The
last equation in (19) is the primal feasibility condition
corresponding the load balance equation in (1b).
Let define WD be the the first I rows of the inverse
of the ZD, i.e.
WD ,
[
II×I
∣∣∣∣ 0I×(nc,DT +1)
] (
ZD
)−1
. (20)
Where II×I is the I×I identity matrix. By solving (19)
we have:
qD = WD ·

−βD
ADLD + T c,D −ADRc
1>LD − 1>c
 (21)
Now we rewrite the closed form formula of the DA
dispatches of the DA conventional generators derived in
(21):
qD = GD1 c+G
D
2 (22)
Where GD1 and G
D
2 are derived from (21).
One approach to calculate the DA-LMPs is to perform
a sensitivity analysis of the changes of the qD w.r.t. the
changes in the nodal demands, and then calculate the
the changes in the system cost (cf. objective function in
(1a)). In order to calculate the DA-LMP at bus u, we
hypothetically change the demand at this bus for a small
amount of power, i.e.  units of power, and calculate the
the change in the DA system cost. Let’s define the vector
of new nodal demands after changing demand at bus u
as LD,newu = L
D +  · Iˆu, where Iˆu is the unit vector of
size N whose uth element is 1 and other elements are
zero. First, we derive the vector of new power dispatches
of the DA conventional generators for the new demand
profile LD,newu . From (21) we have:
qD
∣∣∣
LD,newu
− qD
∣∣∣
LD
=  ·WD

0
AD(u)
1
 (23)
Where AD(u) is the u
th column of AD. Note that, unless
otherwise explicitly said, qD refers to the set of original
power dispatches of the DA conventional generators for
clearing the market, with no small change in the load
profile.
Now, we can calculate the limit of ratio of change in the
system cost (corresponding to the change of  unit of
load at bus u) to , which is DA-LMP at this bus:
λDu = lim
→0
(∑
i∈SDG C
D
i
(
qDi
) ∣∣∣
qDi ∈qD
∣∣
L
D,new
u
−∑i∈SDG CDi (qDi ) ∣∣∣qDi ∈qD∣∣LD
)

(24)
From (23) and (24) we can get the following closed form
formula for the DA price at bus u:
λDu =
(
ΥDqD + βD
)>
WD

0
AD(u)
1
 (25)
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The vector of DA-LMPs is:
λD =
[
0N×I
∣∣ (AD)> ∣∣1N×1] (WD)> (ΥDqD + βD)
(26)
Replacing qD from (22) and with a little algebra we
have:
λD = HD1 c+H
D
2 (27)
Where HD1 and H
D
2 are derived from (26).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Assume that the set of congested lines in the RT
market is Sc,RT , for which each line (m,n) in it is
congested in the direction of bus m to bus n. We
can rewrite the inequalities in (3c) as equalities for the
binding ones, and ignore the rest of them, as following:
ARq˜R = T c,R (28)
Where AR is derived from writing (3c) only for bind-
ing inequalities. Also we need to define the following
matrices:
ARG , ARERG ,
ARR , ARER, (29)
ΥR ,
α
R
1 0
. . .
0 αRJ
 , (30)
and
ZR ,

ΥR
(
ARG
)>
1J×1
ARG 0nc,RT ×nc,RT 0nc,RT ×1
11×J 01×nc,RT 0
 . (31)
Writing the KKT optimality conditions, we have:
ZR ·

qR
γR
τR
=

−βR − EDRG ΥDqD
ARLR −AREDGqD
+ARLD + T c,R −ARRx
1>LR + 1>LD
−1>qD − 1>x

(32)
Where βR =
[
βRi , · · · , βRJ
]>
, and γR =[
γR1 , · · · , γRnc,RT
]>
, where γRt is the dual variable
of the congested line t in the RT economic dispatch
problem (cf. (3c)). τR is the dual variable of the power
balance equation in the RT economic dispatch (cf. (3b)).
EDRG is a J × I matrix, whose element on row r and
column t is one if the RT conventional generator r also
participates in the DA market as the DA conventional
generator t, otherwise, it is zero. The first J equations
in (32) is for the stationarity conditions. The following
nc,RT equations corresponds to the complementary
slackness conditions for those inequalities that are
bindings in (3c) by setting the line flow of those lines
equal to their capacities. The last equation in (32) is
the primal feasibility condition corresponding the load
balance equation in (3b).
Let us define WR be the the first J rows of the inverse
of the ZR, i.e.
WR ,
[
IJ×J
∣∣∣∣ 0J×(nc,RT +1)
] (
ZR
)−1
. (33)
By solving (19) we have:
qR = WR ·

−βR − EDRG ΥDqD
ARLR +ARLD
−AREDGqD + T c,R −ARRx
1>LR + 1>LD − 1>qD − 1>x

(34)
Now we can rewrite the closed form formula of the RT
dispatches of the RT conventional generators derived in
(34) using the closed form formula for qD derived in
(8):
qR = GR1 c+G
R
2 x+G
R
3 (35)
Where GR1 , G
R
2 and G
R
3 are derived from (34).
To calculate the RT-LMP at bus u, we need to hypo-
thetically change the RT demand at this bus for small
amount of power, i.e.  units of power, and calculate
the the change in the RT system cost. First, we need to
calculate the vector of new power dispatches of the RT
conventional generators for the change of  units of RT
demand at bus u. Let’s define LR,newu = L
R +  · Iˆu,
where Iˆu is the unit vector of size N whose uth element
is 1 and other elements are zero. From (34) we have:
qR
∣∣∣
LR,newu
− qR
∣∣∣
LR
=  ·WR

0
AR(u)
1
 (36)
Note that, unless otherwise explicitly said, qR refers
to the vector of original power dispatches of the RT
conventional generators for clearing the RT market with
no small change in the load profile.
Now, we can calculate the limit of ratio of change in the
RT system cost (corresponding to the change of  unit
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of RT demand at bus u) to , which is RT-LMP at this
bus:
λRu = lim
→0
(∑
j∈SRG C
R
j
(
qˆRj
) ∣∣∣
qRj ∈qR
∣∣
L
R,new
u
−∑j∈SRG CRj (qˆRj ) ∣∣∣qRj ∈qR∣∣LR
)

(37)
From (36) and (37) we can get the following closed form
formula for the RT price at bus u:
λRu =
(
ΥRqR + EDRG Υ
DqD + βR
)>
WR

0
AR(u)
1

(38)
The vector of the RT-LMPs is
λR =
[
0N×J
∣∣ (AR)> ∣∣1N×1] (WR)> (ΥRqR
+ EDRG Υ
DqD + βR
)
(39)
Using the closed formulas for qD and qR in (22) and
(35) and with a little algebra we get the following closed
form formula for the λR:
λR = HR1 c+H
R
2 x+H
R
3 (40)
where HR1 , H
R
2 and H
R
3 are derived from (39).
APPENDIX C
CALCULATION OF SOCIAL OPTIMUM
The social optimum refers to the case where the
ISO knows all the information of the RPPs as well as
DA and RT conventional generators and minimizes the
expected system cost. In designing market mechanisms
the primary goal is to achieve social efficiency, meaning
that the expected system cost under the mechanism
would be equal (or at least close) to the expected system
cost at the social optimum. We shall emphasize that
when calculating the social optimum, we assume that
ISO knows everything, including the joint probability
distribution of the RPPs.
In solving the social optimum problem, we generate
a set of possible scenarios for the uncertain variables,
i.e. power generation of the RPPs. Each scenario has a
probability, and ISO may generate some scenarios with
higher probabilities and some other scenarios with lower
probabilities. Based on the the generated scenarios, ISO
solves the following optimization problem
min
qD,{qR,y,
u+,y,u−,y}
∑
i∈SDG
CDi
(
qDi
)
+
∑
y∈SS
ζy ·
{∑
j∈SRG
CRj
(
qˆR,yj
)
+ ψ ·
∑
y∈SS
∑
(m,n)∈ST
(
(u+,y(m,n) + u
−,y
(m,n))
2
)}
=
∑
i∈SDG
(
1
2
αDi · (qDi )2 + βDi qDi
)
+
∑
y∈SS
ζy ·
{
∑
j∈SRG
(
1
2
αRj · (qˆR,yj )2 + βRj qˆR,yj
)
+ ψ ·
∑
y∈SS
∑
(m,n)∈ST
(
(u+,y(m,n) + u
−,y
(m,n))
2
)}
(41a)
s.t.∑
i∈SDG
qDi +
∑
j∈SRG
qR,yj +
∑
k∈SR
xyk =
∑
n∈N
LDn ,∀y ∈ SS
(41b)
u+,y(m,n) ≥
∑
u∈N
PTDF (m,n)u,o · q˜yu −
∑
v∈N
PTDF (m,n)v,o · q˜yv
− T (m,n), ∀(m,n) ∈ ST ,∀y ∈ SS
(41c)
u+,y(m,n) ≥ 0 (41d)
u−,y(m,n) ≥
∑
u∈N
PTDF (n,m)u,o · q˜yu −
∑
v∈N
PTDF (n,m)v,o · q˜yv
− T (m,n), ∀(m,n) ∈ ST ,∀y ∈ SS
(41e)
u−,y(m,n) ≥ 0 (41f)
where q˜yu ,
∑
j∈SRG,u q
R,y
j +
∑
i∈SDG,u q
D
i +∑
k∈SR,u xk − LDu is the net power injected at
bus u under scenario y. Also, qˆR,yj = q
R,y
j + q
D
i if the
RT generator j participated in the DA market as DA
generator i, otherwise, qˆR,yj = q
R,y
j . Set SS is the set of
scenarios and ζy is the probability of scenario y. Note
that, unlike (1c) in DA-OPF or (3c) in RT-OPF, here
we do not impose strict transmission line constraints
because there always could exist a scenario that makes
the optimization problem infeasible. Instead we impose
a penalty coefficient (i.e. ψ) to penalize any line flow
that is greater than the transmission line capacity. The
auxiliary variable u+,y(m,n) (u
−,y
(m,n)) is used to represent
the excess line flow of line (m,n) from bus m to n
(from bus n to m) under scenario y. If the line flow
of a line (m,n) under scenario y is greater than the
capacity of that line, then one of the following two
cases happens:
• The line flow is in the direction of the line that is
defined in the ST , i.e. from bus m to bus n. In
this case the auxiliary variable u+,y(m,n) is equal to
the absolute value of the excess line flow of line
(m,n).
• Or the line flow is in the reverse of the direction of
the line that is defined in the ST , i.e. from bus n to
bus m. In this case the auxiliary variable u−,y(m,n) is
equal to the absolute value of the excess line flow
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of line (m,n).
Note that the optimization formulation penalizes such
cases. Usually ψ is a large number.
